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Abstract—Technology advancements in smart mobile devices
empower mobile users by enhancing mobility, customizability and
adaptability of computing environments. Mobile devices are now
intelligent enough to capture dynamic attributes such as unlock
failures, application usage, location and proximity of devices in
and around its surrounding environment. Different users will
have different set of values for these dynamic attributes. In
traditional attribute based access control, users are authenticated
to access restricted data using long term static attributes such
as password, roles, and physical location. In this paper, in
order to allow secure data access in mobile environment, we
securely combine both the dynamic and static attributes and
develop novel access control technique. Security and performance
analyse show that the proposed scheme substantially reduces the
computational complexity while enhances the security compare
to the conventional schemes.
Index Terms—Access control, dynamic attributes, attribute-
based encryption, multi-authority.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bring your own devices (BYOD) is a trend for today’s
organizations and enterprises. One of the remarkable outcomes
of Cisco survey conducted in the US in 2012 says that 95% of
the survey participants are allowed to use their mobile devices
within their organizations [1]. More and more staffs prefer to
bring their own mobile devices such as tablets, smartphones
and laptop computers to their work place. It is against the
tradition where employees are allocated with company devices
embedded with specific softwares and policies to achieve
security. As a result, IT department requires more flexible
and creative solutions to maintain the security and privacy in
the collaborative environments [15]. Mobility enables users to
create new ideas – they want to work from home or the office
using social networks and cloud services to get the job done
with a seamless solution [2].
On the other hand, advances in cloud computing and out-
sourcing enabled flexible computing capabilities at reduced
costs and capital expenditures. Security vulnerabilities associ-
ated with this new paradigm cannot be satisfied with traditional
access control techniques. Traditionally, we assume that data
owners, users, and storage server are in the same domain and
also that the server is fully trusted [3]. However, in cloud
computing and outsourcing environments, data confidentiality
is not guaranteed since the data is stored and processed within
the third party environment. Personnel information of the
data owners and commercial interests of users can be leaked
to third party if the data owners store decrypted data in
public servers. Hence, achieving the data confidentiality in
a distributed environment is challenging and attribute based
encryption (ABE) technique has been proposed as a plausible
solution [6]–[8], [11].
ABE is one of the most promising cryptographic techniques.
Using ABE, the data owners can enforce fine-grained access
policies based on nature of the data. For instance, let us
assume, an employer uploads encrypted file to the cloud using
ABE, where access policy of that file is defined using the fol-
lowing attributes and functions AND and OR: “Manager” OR
“Finance Office” AND “Company A”. Hence, an employee
who is a “Manager” employed at “Company A” can decrypt
the file.
In BYOD case, the conventional ABE schemes are not
enough to protect the data due to the mobility of user device.
If you consider the previous example, the manager can access
the file while he is traveling in train. The risk level associated
in the example is high and the manager may not aware of the
surrounding environment. Or someone may steal manager’s
mobile device and try to access the file illegally. However,
smart devices have the capability to learn the dynamic at-
tributes in and around the devices, hence, change in user
behavior can be detected easily [4]. Hence, it is crucial
to include dynamic attributes in ABE in order to enhance
security by exploiting features of smart mobile devices, which
will leads to seamless solution. However, conventional ABE
developed based only on static attributes.
In this paper, we propose new algorithm which support
data owner to incorporate the dynamic attributes within ABE
scheme. The contribution of this paper is two folds:
C1. First we will develop an algorithm to securely incorporate
dynamic and static attributes within ABE (Algorithm 1)
C2. Then we exploit a semi-trusted cloud server to outsource
computational and communication costs associated with
the user (Algorithm 2)
We demonstrate that the performance of the Algorithm 1
is comparable with the conventional ABE scheme in terms of
computational and communication costs. However, the Algo-
rithm 2 improves the computational and communication costs
substantially compare to Algorithm 1 since we incorporate
the semi-trusted cloud server. It should be noted that both
the proposed algorithms add additional layer of security (i.e.,
inclusion of dynamic attributes) on top of the security of
conventional ABE schemes (please note that the construction
of conventional ABE is based on well-known identity based
encryption scheme [6]).
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: we
discuss the related work in Section II and in Section III
we securely incorporate dynamic and static attributes to the
conventional ABE scheme. We introduce semi-trusted cloud
server in Section IV to outsource communications and com-
putational cost of algorithm developed in Section III. Security
and performance analyse of proposed schemes are provided in
Section V. Conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Let us discuss the pioneering works in attribute based access
control literature. ABE was firstly proposed by Sahai and Wa-
ters [6], where they constructed an identity based encryption
(IBE) of a message under several attributes that compose a
fuzzy identity. There are two main types of ABE, the key-
policy ABE which was proposed by Goyal et al. [7], and
ciphertext-policy ABE which was proposed in [8]. Chase [18]
presented a multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) system, whereby
any polynomial number of independent attribute authorities
monitor attributes and distribute private-keys. Data owner can
decide a number dk and a set of attributes from an attribute
authority, and encrypt a message such that only an user with
minimum dk attributes from the revelent attribute authority
can decrypt the message.
Chase and Chow proposed another work [19] which im-
proved the previous scheme [18]. In this work, the central
authority was removed and anonymous key issuing protocol
was developed to address privacy of the users. As a result,
multiple attribute authorities cannot collaborate and pool the
attributes by tracing the global identifier of the users. Lewko
and Waters [20] proposed a fully decentralized ABE scheme,
where user could have zero or more attributes from each
attribute authority and do not require a trusted server. In their
work, the attribute authority can join and leave freely without
re-initializing the system.
Outsourcing the decryption of ABE ciphertexts was de-
signed for a single authority in [5]. Since we consider multiple
authorities and dynamic attributes, our work is different from
[5].
Let us now discuss the works in context-related security
mechanisms in the literature. Liao proposed a location data
encryption using static locations [25]. In this work, each
static location is a mobile node with pre-determined longitude
and latitude coordinates. The concept of “Geoencryption” or
“location-based encryption” was developed to use in digital
film distribution by Logan Scott et al [24]. Omar et. al. pre-
sented a geoencryption protocol by restricting the decryption
of a message to a particular location and time period [26]. The
encryption in this work is similar to [25] where the locations
Fig. 1. Single authority ABE scheme.
were static which means they are pre-defined in the system.
Vijayalakshmi and Palanivelu proposed a secure localization
using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) in wireless sensor
networks, where determining the physical positions of sensors
is a fundamental and crucial problem in the wireless sensor
network operation [27]. Their location based authentication
scheme was built on the ID-based cryptography using ECC
and ECC key exchange. Karimi presented a geoencryption
protocol which allows mobile nodes to communicate with each
other by restriction when decoding a message in the specific
location and time period [28]. It should be noted that these
algorithms provide neither fine-grain access control nor data
confidentiality. Moreover, none of the algorithms supports both
the static and dynamic attributes together for robust access
control.
In contrast to all of the works discussed earlier, the al-
gorithms proposed in this paper combines both the dynamic
attributes and static attributes within ABE. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first known results that enhances the
secure data access in mobile environment. We present the
cryptographic building blocks exploited in the new algorithms
in the following sub-sections.
A. Bilinear Pairings
Let G1,G2 be two multiplicative groups of prime order q
and let g1 and g2 be generators of G1 and G2, respectively.
Let us denote a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT . The map
has the following three properties.
1) Bilinearity: ∀x ∈ G1, ∀y ∈ G2, and a, b ∈ Zq, there is
eˆ(xa, yb) = eˆ(x, y)ab.
2) Non-degeneracy: For ∀x ∈ G1, ∀y ∈ G2, there is
eˆ(x, y) ̸= 1.
3) Computability: eˆ is an efficient computation.
B. Attribute Based Encryption
ABE allows the data to be encrypted in such a way that
the encrypted data can only be accessed by individuals who
have the credentials for necessary attributes. In ABE scheme,
trusted attribute authorities maintain encryption and decryption
Setup S
• Collision-Resistant Hash Function (CRHF) H : {0, 1}
∗
→ Zq . CRHF can be used to generate user identity u from
the user global identity (GID).
• For a given security parameters λ and σ ∈ {0, 1}
poly(λ)
, group bilinear parameters are generated by the attribute
authorities as follwos: q, g1, g2,G1,G2,GT ← S(1
λ;σ). Now, attribute authorities interact with each other and execute
the following:
. kth attribute authority randomly chooses vk ∈R Zq and computes Yk = eˆ(g1, g2)
vk , and sends Yk to the other attribute
authorities, where each attribute authority computes Y =
∏
Yk = eˆ(g1, g2)
∑
k vk .
. Each pair of attribute authorities shares a secret, kth attribute authority and jth attribute authority randomly choose
skj ∈ Zq such that skj = sjk.
. kth attribute authority randomly chooses xk ∈ Zq and computes yk = g
xk
1 . Using the shared secret sk,j and u,
attribute authorities k and j computes y
xj/(skj+u)
k and y
xk/(skj+u)
j , respectively.
• kth attribute authority randomly chooses a secret tk,i ∈ Zq for i
th attribute, and computes the corresponding public
key as Tk,i = g
tk,i
2 (∀i ∈ {1, ..., Nk} and k ∈ {1, ...,K}), where Nk is the number of attributes monitored by
authority k.
Key Issuing KG
User u executes the following steps with each authority k:
• For j ∈ {1, ...,K} / {k}, user gets the Dkj = g
Rkj
1 y
xj/(skj+u)
k for k > j or Dkj = g
Rkj
1 y
(skj+u)/xj
k if k < j, where
Rk,j ∈ Zq is a random value.
• After obtains all Dkj , user computes Du =
∏
(k,j)∈{1,...,N}×{1,...,N}/{k}Dkj = g
Ru
1 , where
Ru =
∑
(k,j)∈{1,...,K}×{1,...,K}/{k}Rkj .
• If user u satisfies dk number of attributes, then k
th attribute authority randomly picks a dk-degree polynomial pk,u
with pk,u(0) = vk −
∑
j∈{1,...,K}/{k}Rkj .
• Authority k computes Sk,i = g
pk,u(i)/tk,i
1 , i ∈ [1, . . . , Nk], ∀k.
Encryption E
Data owner encrypts data m for attribute set Am = A
1
A
∪
A2A
∪
. . . AKA
∪
AC as follows (i.e. A
k
A, ∀ k denotes the attribute
set maintained by kth attribute authority):
* Data owner randomly picks sA, sB ∈R Zq and encrypts the data as follows: Encm = mY
sB .
* Data owner computes E0 = h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n))Y
sA+sB , E1 = g
sA
2 ,{
Ck,i = T
sA
k,i
}
, i ∈ AkA, ∀k ∈ [1, ..., N ].
* Now data owner uploads CTm = {Encm, E0, E1, Ck,i∀i ∈ AA and AC} into the cloud.
Decryption D
* User downloads CTm from the cloud and checks the required attributes to decrypt m.
* For each authority k:
* Using Sk,i and the corresponding Ck,i, user computes eˆ (Sk,i, Ck,i) = eˆ (g1, g2)
sApk,u(i).
* User interpolates all eˆ (g1, g2)
sApk,u(i) and gets Pk,u = eˆ (g1, g2)
sApk,u(0) = eˆ (g1, g2)
sA(vk−
∑
j ̸=k Rkj) .
* User multiplies all Pk,u’s together and gets Q = eˆ(g1, g2)
sA
∑
vk−sARu = Y
sA
eˆ(gRu1 ,g
sA
2 )
.
* Now corporate app installed in users’ mobile device computes h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)|| . . . ||M(a
′
a,n)).
* User can decrypt the data as follows (only if h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)|| . . . ||M(a
′
a,n)) =
h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n)))
Encm.
h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)||...||M(a
′
a,n))Qeˆ(Du,E1)
E0
= mY sB .
h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)||...||M(a
′
a,n))Y
sA
h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)||...||M(aa,n))Y sA+sB
= m.
Fig. 2. Algorithm 1: SD-ABAC: Static and Dynamic Attributes Based Access Control Scheme for Secure Data Access in Mobile Environment.
credentials for various attributes. These attribute authorities
verify the user attributes before releasing the corresponding
credentials for the attributes. Data owner obtains the en-
cryption credentials for a set of attributes from the attribute
authority, and encrypts the data using those credentials. Once
encryption is successful, the encrypted data can be uploaded
into the cloud storage where any users with the decryption
credentials will be able to decrypt the data. Fig. 1 shows how
data owner, attribute authority and users interact with each
other. We propose our new algorithms in the next sections.
III. SD-ABAC: STATIC AND DYNAMIC ATTRIBUTE
BASED ACCESS SCHEME
In a traditional ABE system, there is only one attribute
authority that monitors all the attributes and issues encryption
and decryption credentials for the users. This single authority
becomes a fully trusted party to which the users have to prove
their attributes in order to obtain the decryption credentials. In
such a case, the attribute authority has too much power and it
can decrypt all the data and knows all the users’ attributes. In
the event of corruption, the message confidentiality cannot be
achieved and users’ privacy can be obtained by the attackers.
This is one of the drawbacks in single authority ABE scheme.
It is more convenient and secure to monitor and maintain
different sets of attributes by different attribute authorities
in reality, e.g., in healthcare one authority can monitor at-
tributes of nurse and doctors while another authority monitors
attributes of administrators and human resources [21], [22] or
in vehicular adhoc network (VANET), different identities can
be monitored by different authorities [9]. Hence, it is more
convenient to have multiple attribute authorities where each
attribute authority can maintain attributes belonging to one
department.
MA-ABE scheme without incorporating the dynamic at-
tributes was proposed in [19]. We develop our new algorithm
(i.e., Algorithm 1) by securely incorporating the dynamic
attributes within MA-ABE scheme in [19]. The proposed
algorithm is composed of four sub-algorithms named as setup,
key issuing, encryption and decryption. This new algorithm is
presented in Fig. 2. Please note that the steps denoted as * in
Fig. 2 are different from the conventional MA-ABE algorithm
[19]. Let us briefly explain the functionalities of each sub
algorithms below.
Setup: The setup algorithm takes security parameters λ and
σ as input, and outputs a bilinear group and a set of parame-
ters. Parameters q, g1, g2,G1,G2,GT are public parameters.
Parameters vk and xk are the private-keys known only to
kth attribute authority and the corresponding public-keys are
Yk = eˆ(g1, g2)
vk and yk = g
xk
1 which are known to all. Two
attribute authorities share a private-key sjk which is known
only to the two attribute authorities. Parameter tk,i denote
the ith attribute maintained by kth attribute authority and the
corresponding public-key is Tk,i = g
tk,i
2 .
Key Issuing: Data owner computes decryption credential
Dkj for j
th attribute by collaborating with kth attribute
authority. Once user obtained all theDkj then she can compute
Du followed by Sk,i.
Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes attributes
maintained by the attribute authorities and attributes defined
by the data owner as inputs. Then it output the ciphertext of
the data.
Decryption: The decryption algorithm takes the de-
cryption credentials received from attribute authorities and
context-related parameters obtained from smart mobile de-
vice and the ciphertext as input and output the origi-
nal data. The behaviour profiling app securely computes
the hash value of the required dynamic attributes followed
by multiplication with Y sA . The decryption is success-
ful if and only if h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)|| . . . ||M(a
′
a,n)) =
h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n)).
The novelty in our scheme compared to the conventional
ABE scheme lies in the encryption and the decryption sub
algorithms. Let us denote a set of dynamic attributes defined by
the data owner as AC = {ac,1, . . . , ac,n} where ac,i denotes
the ith dynamic attribute. For the sake of simplicity let us con-
sider the following three dynamic attributes: ac,1 =”location”,
ac,2 =”risk level associated with his recent app usage” and
ac,3 =”unlock failures in last two days”. Now the data owner
defines AC = {ac,1 = “LONDON”, ac,2 < “3” and ac,3 <
“2” } and computes E0 = h(LONDON ||yes||yes)Y
sA+sB .
Let us assume that the risk level varies between 1 to 10
where higher risk denoted by larger value. However, different
organizations may define the risk level based on their own
standards. For example, if a particular document is highly
classified then, the organization sets high risk value for that
document rather than the risk value of ordinary documents.
IV. LSD-ABAC: LOW COMPLEXITY STATIC AND
DYNAMIC ATTRIBUTE BASED ACCESS SCHEME
In Fig. 2, we assumed that the users will use their mobile
devices to access and decrypt the encrypted data. If we
recall the key-issuing and decryption processes presented in
Fig. 2, it is obvious that the user’s mobile device requires
to do computationally intensive operations such as bilinear
pairing, exponentiation and multiplication. Hence, performing
these computationally intensive operations reduce the user
experience. Moreover in the key-issuing stage, user’s mobile
device need to interact with attribute authorities several times
in order to retrieve the decryption credentials. However, the
mobile data network may not be reliable for all communication
and it can cause huge overheads and communication delays.
In our previous work [11], we introduced a semi-trusted
authority to outsource the computational and communica-
tion cost associated with the users in MA-ABE scheme. In
[11], substantial amount of communications and computational
costs are outsourced to the semi-trusted authority without com-
promising the security and privacy of the MA-ABE scheme
[19]. The semi-trusted authority interacts with the attribute
authorities on behalf of the user and obtains the masked
shared-decryption-keys. Later the semi-trusted authority com-
bines all the keys and gets one masked-key which can only be
unmasked by a user to decrypt the message. In particular, semi-
trusted authority cannot decrypt the message nor determine the
attributes of the mobile user, hence, the security and privacy of
the proposed MA-ABE scheme is preserved. We are going to
use similar semi-trusted authority in this paper to outsource the
computational and communications costs associated with the
user in Algorithm 1 (Fig. 2). The details of the low complexity
static and dynamic MA-ABE based access control scheme
is presented in Fig. 3 (Algorithm 2). We briefly explain the
functionality of the scheme in the following.
Setup: The setup algorithm executes the same process as
the proposed scheme in Fig. 2.
Key Issuing: The sub-algorithm incorporates semi-trusted
authority. The semi-trusted authority executes several steps
with each attribute authority on behalf of user u. Hence,
communication and computational overheads during the key
issuing process have been offloaded to cloud based semi-
trusted authority.
• For authority j ∈ {1, ...,K} / {k}, semi-trusted authority
gets Dkj = g
Rkj
1 y
xj/(skj+u)
k for k > j or Dkj =
g
Rkj
1 y
(skj+u)/xj
k if k < j.
• Semi-trusted authority combines all Dkj and computes
Du =
∏
(k,j)∈{1,...,N}×{1,...,N}/{k}Dkj = g
Ru
1 .
• If user u satisfies the required dk number of attributes,
then authority k randomly picks a dk-degree polynomial
pk,u.
• Authority k defines pk,u(0) = vk + rk −∑
j∈{1,...,K}/{k}Rkj and computes Sk,i = g
pk,u(i)/tk,i
1 ,
i ∈ [1, . . . , Nk].
Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes a set of at-
tributes maintain by attribute authorities as well as a set of
context-related attributes defined by data owner as inputs. Then
it output the ciphertext of the data. It executes the same process
as the proposed scheme in Fig. 2.
Decryption: The decryption algorithm takes the decryption
credentials received from attribute authorities and context-
related parameters obtained from smart mobile device and
the ciphertext as input and output the original data. The
decryption algorithm main executes two phases. Firstly, semi-
trusted authority uses any required parameters and compute
the partial decryption key for the user. Secondly, the smart
mobile device securely computes the hash value of the required
context-related attributes followed by multiplication with Y sA .
Then, user use the pre-shared secret, partial decryption key
received from semi-trusted authority, and the hash value of
the context-related attributes.
Decryption process by semi-trusted authority: For each
authority k, semi-trusted authority uses Sk,i, Ck,i to compute
Pk,u. Then semi-trusted authority multiplies all Pk,u together
and gets Q. In order to reduce the computation work at the
mobile device, semi-trusted authority also computes T and
sends T to the user.
Decryption process by mobile device: Using the
pre-shared secret with authority k, user compute∏
eˆ(grk1 , g
sA
2 ) = eˆ(g1, g2)
sA
∑
rk = Y sA
∑
rk . Now
the corporate app installed in user’s mobile device
captures real-time contextual attributes. The decryption is
successful if and only if h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)|| . . . ||M(a
′
a,n))
= h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n)). Then user obtains
Y sA = T/Y sA
∑
rk . The original data is recovered as
follows:
Encm.
h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)|| . . . ||M(a
′
a,n))Qeˆ (Du, E1)
E0Y sA
∑
rk
=
mY sB .
h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)|| . . . ||M(a
′
a,n))Y
sA+sA
∑
rk
h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n))Y sA+sB+sA
∑
rk
,
= m.
In the low complexity scheme, the user u and authority k
have a pre-shared secret rk, which is blind to the semi-trusted
authority. During the key issuing process, authority k embeds
rk into pk,u(0) = vk+rk−
∑
j∈{1,...,K}/{k}Rkj . When semi-
trusted authority executes the decryption process, rk prevents
semi-trusted authority from combines keys together to obtain
the final decryption key. In the next section, we analyse the
performance and security of the proposed algorithms.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyse the computation and communi-
cation costs associated with the schemes proposed schemes.
The efficiencies of the proposed algorithms are demonstrated
by comparing them against the conventional ABE schemes.
A. Reduction in Computational overhead
In the original MA-ABE, the user involve in key issuing
and decryption stages. Hence, we can assume that the setup
stage in the Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 can be done in off line for all
three schemes (i.e., including conventional MA-ABE scheme).
Denote the computational costs in G for multiplication, expo-
nentiation, and pairing as Cm, Cex and Cp, respectively. Let
us also denote the total number of attribute authorities as K
and n number of attributes from each authority will be used
for encryption (for simplicity, we assumed equal number of
attributes across all attribute authorities).
Let us evaluate the computational complexity involved in
the remaining three stages. Table I shows all the computational
complexities involve in key issuing (for user), encryption (for
data owner) and decryption (for user) for all three schemes.
Since we introduced a semi-trusted authority in LSD-ABAC,
there is no computationally intensive task involved during the
key issuing stage for the user. For other two schemes, compu-
tational complexities for key issuing are equal. Similarly, all
three schemes share almost same computational complexity
for encryption stage.
In order to graphically visualize the actual difference be-
tween the proposed schemes and conventional algorithm in
decryption stage, we plotted the computational complexities
given in Table I by varying the number of attributes, n, and
number of authorities in Fig. 4. For this comparison, we
used the benchmark time values given with popular pairing-
based cryptography library namely jPBC in [10], [23]. Time
complexities for operations Cp, Cm, and Cex, are 491.2ms,
20ms, and 34.1ms, respectively. The computational complexity
is measured in terms of total time required for the the user to
decrypt the data. It is obvious from Fig. 4 that our SD-ABAC
performs equally well as the conventional MA-ABE scheme.
Setup S -Same as in Fig. 2
Key Issuing KG
The semi-trusted authority executes the following steps with each authority k on behalf of user u, hence the following
communication and computational overheads have been offloaded to semi-trusted authority:
• For j ∈ {1, ...,K} / {k}, semi-trusted authority gets the Dkj = g
Rkj
1 y
xj/(skj+u)
k for k > j or Dkj = g
Rkj
1 y
(skj+u)/xj
k
if k < j, where Rk,j ∈ Zq is a random value.
• After receiving all Dkj , semi-trusted authority computes Du =
∏
(k,j)∈{1,...,N}×{1,...,N}/{k}Dkj = g
Ru
1 , where
Ru =
∑
(k,j)∈{1,...,K}×{1,...,K}/{k}Rkj .
• If user u satisfies dk number of attributes, then k
th attribute authority randomly picks a dk-degree polynomial pk,u.
• Now using the pre-shared secret rk, authority k defines pk,u(0) = vk + rk −
∑
j∈{1,...,K}/{k}Rkj
• Authority k computes Sk,i = g
pk,u(i)/tk,i
1 , i ∈ [1, . . . , Nk].
Encryption E -Same as in Fig.2
Decryption by semi-trusted authority DS
* Semi-trusted authority downloads CTm from the cloud and checks the required attributes to decrypt m.
* For each authority k:
* Using Sk,i and the corresponding Ck,i, user computes eˆ (Sk,i, Ck,i) = eˆ (g1, g2)
sApk,u(i).
* semi-trusted authority interpolates all eˆ (g1, g2)
sApk,u(i) and gets Pk,u = eˆ (g1, g2)
sApk,u(0) =
eˆ (g1, g2)
sA(vk+rk−
∑
j ̸=k Rkj) .
* Semi-trusted authority multiplies all Pk,u’s together and gets Q = eˆ(g1, g2)
sA
∑
(vk+rk)−sARu = Y
sA+sA
∑
rk
eˆ(gRu1 ,g
sA
2 )
.
* Semi-trusted authority computes T = eˆ(Du, E1) ·Q = eˆ(g
Ru
1 , g
s
2) ·Q = Y
sA+sA
∑
rk , and send T to the user.
Decryption by User DU
* User computes
∏
eˆ(grk1 , g
sA
2 ) = eˆ(g1, g2)
sA
∑
rk = Y sA
∑
rk
* Now corporate app installed in user’s mobile device computes h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)|| . . . ||M(a
′
a,n)).
* User computes Y sA = T/Y sA
∑
rk
* User can decrypt the data as follows (only if h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)|| . . . ||M(a
′
a,n)) =
h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n)))
Encm.
h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)||...||M(a
′
a,n))Qeˆ(Du,E1)
E0Y
sA
∑
rk
= mY sB .
h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)||...||M(a
′
a,n))Y
sA+sA
∑
rk
h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)||...||M(aa,n))Y
sA+sB+sA
∑
rk
= m.
Fig. 3. Algorithm 2: LSD-ABAC: Lightweight Static and Dynamic Attributes Based Access Control Scheme for Secure Data Access in Mobile Environment.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF COMPUTATION COST OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHMS AGAINST THE CONVENTIONAL MA-ABE.
MA-ABE SD-ABAC LSD-ABAC
Key Issuing (K − 1)× Cm (K − 1)× Cm -
Encryption (nK + 2)× Cex + Cm (nK + 3)× Cex + 2Cm (nK + 3)× Cex + 2Cm
Decryption (nK + 1)× Cm + (nK + 1)× Cp (nK + 3)× Cm + (nK + 1)× Cp K × Cp + (K + 4)× Cm
In LSD-ABAC scheme, since the mobile user outsourced the
part of the decryption process to the semi-trusted authority,
the computational complexity become independent of number
of attributes and substantially lower than other two schemes.
B. Reduction in Communication overhead
The communication overheads is always an important factor
in mobile environment. In conventional MA-ABE scheme
[19], the user needs to execute (N−1) independent invocations
for each authority during the key issuing stage. With the in-
creasing number of authorities, it is generating a large network
overhead. In our LSD-ABAC scheme, those communications
have been leveraged to the cloud server based semi-trusted
authority, hence the mobile devices are not necessary take
part in the numerous communication requests and responses.
It is reasonable to assumes there will be fixed broadband
connections between the semi-trusted authority and attribute
authorities. Fig. 5 shows the total number of interaction
between user and authorities for both the proposed schemes
and conventional scheme.
Number of interactions between user and attribute authori-
ties in MA-ABE and SD-ABAC are almost equal. However,
since we introduced a semi-trusted authority in LSD-ABAC,
the user only needs to interact with the semi-trusted authority
which in fact constant and substantially lower than other
schemes.
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C. Security Analysis
The proposed static and dynamic ABE schemes were built
on top of conventional ABE architectures [7], [19]. Our
schemes do not degrade the security and privacy of the
encrypted message and the mobile user compared to the
original schemes. Further more, it satisfies data confidentiality
of encrypted data against unauthorized users and the curious
cloud service providers under the selective identity model. It
also maintains the collusion resistance against up to (N − 2)
attribute authorities. Let us explain possible attacks and how
our schemes overcome those in the following subsections.
1) Collusion Attacks: ABE system vulnerable for collusion
attacks. There are two main types of collusion: (1) attribute
authorities collide with each other and aggregate users’
attributes (2) users can collide with other and pool their
own decryption keys to access data which are not authorized
to none of them. Since our schemes were built top of the
conventional MA-ABE scheme, the proposed schemes also
collusion resistance against up to (N−2) attribute authorities.
Hence, let us discuss the user collusion.
• User collusion in SD-ABAC and LSD-ABAC
During the key-issuing algorithm, user u in SD-ABAC
or semi-trusted authority in LSD-ABAC obtains Dkj =
g
Rkj
1 y
xj/(skj+u)
k . User identity u is embedded within
decryption key by inverse exponentiation operation after
adding u with random value skj . Fist of all, it is infeasible
to infer xj/(skj + u) from y
xj/(skj+u)
k . Secondly, since
the user identity is randomized by skj and incorporated
inversely within decryption key prevent malicious user
from modifying u. Hence, the user collusion in the
proposed schemes is infeasible.
2) Malicious Semi-trusted Authority: During the Key Is-
suing stage, the semi-trusted authority performs most of the
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Fig. 5. Comparison of Communication Overheads
steps instead of user. The kth authority computes Sk,i =
g
pk,u(i)/tk,i
1 , i ∈ [1, . . . , Nk] and sends them to semi-trusted
authority. If the user satisfies the minimum dk number of at-
tributes, then the degree of the polynomial chosen by attribute
authority is equal to dk. Hence, dk number of Sk,i can be used
to get the secret pk,u(0) = vk+rk−
∑
j∈{1,...,K}/{k}Rkj dur-
ing the interpolation. If the user does not satisfy the minimum
dk number of attributes then the degree of the polynomial
chosen by the kth attribute authority is equal to Nk +1. This
is the crucial point, because the kth attribute authority sends
only Nk number of Sk,i = g
pk,u(i)/tk,i
1 , i ∈ [1, . . . , Nk] to
the semi-trusted authority, where the semi-trusted authority
would require Nk + 1 number of Sk,i to recover the secret
pk,u (0). Therefore, the semi-trusted authority cannot be able
to distinguish which set of attributes belongs to the mobile
user, and furthermore cannot be able to pool all Sk,i’s from
all attribute authorities in order to find the attributes of mobile
user. This preserves the privacy of the user.
During the Decryption stage, the semi-trusted authority
performs the steps in place of the authority attribute authority.
In more detail, the semi-trusted authority only computes
T = eˆ(Du, E1)·Q = eˆ(g
Ru
1 , g
s
2)·Q = Y
sA+sA
∑
rk in contrast
to the Y s that is computed by the authority in the Chase-Chow
scheme. As the required decryption key to decrypt the message
m is Y s, the semi-trusted authority cannot decrypt to obtain
the message m, therefore the confidentiality of the message
is ensured. More precisely, since the shared secret rk is only
known to the kth attribute authority and the mobile user, and
thus the summation
∑
k rk can only be obtained by a mobile
user; therefore the semi-trusted authority cannot obtain Y s
from its known expression of T = Y s+s
∑
rk = Y sY s
∑
rk .
Moreover, since the data owner enforces dynamic attributes
during the encryption process, adversary must satisfy not only
the static attributes from authorities but also the dynamic
attributes. Without the authorized dynamic attributes, it is
impossible to decrypt the message m. Let us discuss whether
feeding false values for dynamic attributes in order to decrypt
the message is possible in the next subsection.
3) Attribute Cheating: Recently, a novel behavior profiling
technique is developed to detect misuse of mobile devices
[12], [13]. Mobile user activities such as app usage, network
usage, charging times and unlock failures have been used to
profile the user behavior. Hence, variations in user activity
(i.e., anomalous activity) can be detected. Let us assume that
there is an app which combines location information and time
stamp together with user behavior profile, and uses machine
learning techniques to detect anomaly activities (let us call this
app as ”behavior-profiling” app). Installing behavior-profiling
app in the user mobile device can be used to verify whether the
current user is the owner of the mobile device [14]. Samsung
and Blackberry introduced robust security softwares called
KNOX and Blackberry Enterprise Server (BES), respectively
[15]–[17]. These softwares are capable to securely install
corporate apps (i.e. behavior-profiling app) on users mobile
devices and check for integrity of installed apps. Hence,
modifying behavior profiling app to feed false information can
be easily detected by data owner using either KNOX or BES.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed static and dynamic attribute based
access control schemes for the multi-authority scenario. In
the proposed schemes, the data owner can incorporate the
dynamic attributes together with the conventional attributes
which are maintained by attribute authorities. Inclusion of
dynamic attributes for encryption provides run-time security
to the data stored in the cloud. Hence, even if the user has
the credentials from the attribute authorities, the dynamic
attributes must be satisfied in order to decrypt the data in the
mobile device. We exploited the cloud infrastructure in order to
outsource the heavy computational work and communication
overheads in mobile user. We showed the proposed schemes
enhances the security by adding dynamic attributes to the
conventional attribute based encryption while substantially
reduce the computational complexity to the mobile user.
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